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Abstract
The aim of this article is to argue that the abortion rights of adolescents
should be coextensive with those of adults. The first section of the article reviews
research in child development which has demonstrated that adolescents are able
to make informed, mature decisions on procreative issues. The second section
reviews cases which have defined the contours of adult women’s abortion rights,
and argues that the reasoning behind those holdings also applies to adolescents.
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The Abortion Rights of Adolescents Should be Coextensive with those of Adults: a
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Chad M. Gerson1

I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to argue that the abortion rights of adolescents
should be coextensive with those of adults. The view that the abortion rights of
adolescents should be coextensive with those of adults is commonly held, but
under-theorized. It may not be obvious why adolescents should have full control
over procreative issues, because they do not have full control over themselves in
many other aspects of their lives. For a number of reasons, however, procreative
rights belong in a special category. Adolescents already tend to involve their
parents in decisions of great magnitude such as those regarding procreation and
sexuality. Adolescents who choose not to involve their parents usually have a
good reason for avoiding parental involvement, such as an abusive or
unsupportive family situation. Requiring adolescents to go through their parents
to obtain contraception or abortion services, or allowing parents to force these
measures, can create significant and long-term stress in the adolescent.
Furthermore, much of the reasoning in cases granting or expanding women’s
rights to these services can also be applied to adolescents. By identifying cases
and theory on point and with a bit of extrapolation, a theoretical framework will
emerge to justify the including of abortion rights for this special category.
1 J.D., University of Chicago 2005. The author is currently a law clerk in the chambers of the
Honorable Michael J. Reagan of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois. The author would like to thank Prof. Emily Buss for her assistance.

This issue is especially timely because of new federal legislation. On July
27, 2006, the Senate passed a bill known as the Child Custody Protection Act
sometimes referred to as the Teen Endangerment Act, which would create two
new federal crimes.2 On April 27, 2005, the House of Representatives passed a
similar bill entitled the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act,3 which would
create the same two crimes. The first potential new federal crime is transporting a
minor across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion in violation of
the minor’s home state’s parental involvement law.4 The second potential new
federal crime is performing or inducing an abortion on an adolescent outside her
state of residence without providing her parents with actual notice and delaying
the procedure for 24 hours.5 Both sections contain an exception providing for a
“judicial bypass.”6 The bypass allows adolescents who do not wish to involve their
parents in the decision to appear before a judge, who will then decide if she is
competent to decide on her own to obtain an abortion, or to decide that the
abortion is in her best interest,7 regardless of whether she is competent. The
second section of the legislation imposes parental involvement on minors who for
whatever reason travel to a different state to obtain an abortion, regardless of
Child Custody Protection Act, S.8.IS, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006). If passed, it will be codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2431-32.
2

3 Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, H.R. 748, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005). The text of
the bill (House version) is available online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c109:1:./temp/~c109vAaBPD::>.
4

Id. § 2431(a)(2).
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Id. § 2432(a)(2). This provision is not in the Senate version of the bill.

6

Id. §§ 2431(e)(2)(A)(ii), 2432(d)(4)(A)(ii).

7

In most states. (Citations to state laws omitted.)

whether her home state or the state where she seeks an abortion has any state
parental involvement laws.8 The section allows physicians to ignore the parental
notification requirement if the physician’s state of practice has its own parental
involvement law, and the physician complies with the provisions of that law.9
Interestingly, “parental involvement laws” as defined by the legislation include
only those state laws which require the involvement of a parent or guardian; they
do not include those which allow other related and responsible adults
(grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc) to be involved in place of the parents.10 This
exclusivity in the definition of which state laws must be heeded by other states
means that states that have tried to balance the perceived need for adult
involvement in abortion decisions with the possibility that an adolescent might
not be comfortable involving her actual parents will not have their laws respected
in other states.11 This selectivity shows the bias of the House bill toward parental
involvement laws and its interest in making abortions generally more difficult to
obtain.12 A person who violates the interstate transport portion of the legislation,

8

Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, § 2432(a)(2), supra note 3.

9

Id. § 2432(b)(1).

10

Id. §§ 2431(e)(4), 2432(e)(6).

Ten states have such laws: Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12-37.5-102–104), Delaware (24 Del.
Code Ann. §§ 1781–84), Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 135L.2–6), Maine (22 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §
1597-A), Maryland (Md. Health-General Code Ann. § 20-103), North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 90-21.6), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.121), South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 44-4132), West Virginia (W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-2F-1–4), and Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.375).
11

12

Typical are the remarks of Mr. McHenry, Member of Congress from North Carolina:
America as a nation must defend life from the moment of
conception to natural death. . . . This bill will protect minors and
their parents from inconsistent state laws. . . . This bill would
prosecute anyone who transports a minor to a state without
parental consent laws with the purpose of undermining parental

or a physician who violates the inducement portion of the legislation, faces a fine,
up to one year in prison, or both.13 Additionally, the parental notification
requirement in the legislation, or in the state laws to which it refers, are framed
in terms of “parents’ rights.”14 The legislation provides a civil remedy for parents
whose “rights” have been violated by a physician performing an abortion on their
adolescent daughter or a person who assists in transporting their adolescent
daughter across state lines.15 Given that many states recognize a tort for loss of
consortium between parents and children,16 the creation of a new civil remedy

rights. . . . [W]e need to make sure that we have serious parental
involvement in these difficult and potentially dangerous
decisions.
Congressional Record H2555, April 27, 2005 (emphasis added).
13

Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, §§ 2431(a)(1), 2432(a)(1), supra note 3.

14

Id. §§ 2431(a)(2), 2432(a)(2).

15

Id. §§ 2431(d), 2432(c).

Thirty states have statutes on the books specifically allowing loss of consortium claims by
parents suffering emotionally because of a child’s death or emotional or physical injury: Alaska
(Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09-55.580), Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-641; see also Reben v. Ely,
705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102), Colorado (Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-21-203), Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.21), Georgia (Official Code of Ga. Ann. § 514-4), Hawai’i (Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 663-3), Idaho (Idaho Code Ann. § 5-310), Illinois (740 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 180/2; see also Lande v. Lande, 567 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 1991)), Indiana
(Ind. Code Ann. § 34-23-2-1), Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1903), Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
411.135), Louisiana (La. Civ. Code Art. 2315.2), Maryland (Md. Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Code Ann. § 3-904), Massachusetts (Ann. Laws of Mass. GL ch. 231, § 85X), Michigan (Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. § 600.2922), Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13), Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 537.090), Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-512; see also In re Estate of Farnum, 730
P.2d 391 (Mont. 1986)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:12), North Carolina (N.C.
Gen Stat. Ann. § 28A-18-2), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-04), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2125.02), Oklahoma (12 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1053), Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30.020),
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-1-41), Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113), Vermont
(14 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1492), and Washington (Ann. Rev. Code Wash. § 4.24.010). Several others
have recognized this tort judicially. Only five states have eliminated this tort: Alabama (Smith v.
Richardson, 171 So.2d 96 (1965)), Delaware (Cann v. Mann Constr. Co., 93 A.2d 741 (1952)),
District of Columbia (D.C. Code Ann. § 16–2701; see also Saunders v. Air Florida, Inc., 558 F.
Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1983)), New York (N.Y. Cons. Laws Serv. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5–
4.1; see also Archambeault v. Draper, 101 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1951)), and South Dakota (S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 21-5-7).
16

seems overly punitive and aimed at making abortion more difficult to obtain,
regardless of the additional costs imposed. For physicians, this provision
threatens to increase their already high malpractice insurance premiums, and
threatens to create a conflict between their self-interest and their duty to assist
patients to the best of their ability.17
In 2004, the First Circuit enjoined the enforcement of a New Hampshire
parental notification statute.18 The law was challenged by Planned Parenthood
because, although it makes an exception for the life of the young woman, it makes
no exception for her health.19 This was the major reason the First Circuit struck
the law.20 The Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit’s ruling, holding that the
entire statute need not be invalidated because some portions of it are
unconstitutional in medical emergencies, but declined to revisit its abortion
precedents as some anti-abortion advocates had urged.21

17 See the remarks of Ms. Johnson, Member of Congress from Connecticut: “This bill requires
physicians to reveal information that under HIPAA [the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg et seq.] and all confidentiality laws, they are not allowed to
reveal. So this puts a burden on physicians that is extraordinary, and they are small businesses,
and we need to remember that.” Congressional Record H2598, April 27, 2005.
18 See Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
24479 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
2005 U.S. LEXIS 4192 (May 23, 2005), docket no. 04-1144.
19

See id. at 55–57.

20

See id. at 65.

21

See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. ___ (January 18, 2006). In so
ruling, the Court resolved a circuit split concerning when abortion laws should be enjoined by
federal courts. In the instant case, the District Court enjoined the law before it took effect. See id.
at 56–57. New Hampshire had argued that an abortion law should be enjoined only when there is
no conceivable set of circumstances under which the law could be constitutional, relying on
United States v. Salerno, 418 U.S. 739 (1987), a criminal case unrelated to abortion. See 390 F.3d
at 57. However, the First Circuit held that the “undue burden” test, propagated in Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), replaced Salerno with regard to abortion
cases. See 390 F.3d at 57–59.

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH REGARDING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS

FOR

ABORTION
The reason for any law restricting the rights of minors compared to adults
is that minors are presumed to be less competent than adults in making most
decisions. From birth through adulthood there is a development toward more
complex reasoning, morality, and contextualizing in the human brain.22 The pace
of this development is not constant. Adolescence, especially early adolescence, is
a time of rapid development. Because reproductive issues are tied to sexuality, it
is natural to assume that the ability of adolescents to deal effectively with
reproductive issues develops rapidly during early adolescence, when their bodies
are also developing rapidly. The consciousness of the transition to physical
maturity often results in tremendous anxiety in adolescence, with a great deal of
time spent on thinking about sexual and reproductive issues. Proper and effective
sex education programs should assist adolescents in being able to effectively deal
with these issues.

A. ADOLESCENTS AS A GROUP UNDERSTAND THE GRAVITY OF ABORTION AND CONSIDER
IT

CAREFULLY; THEY

ALSO INVOLVE

PARENTS WHEN NECESSARY, MAKING PARENTAL

INVOLVEMENT LAWS UNNECESSARY

22

See generally Laura E. Berk, Child Development (Pearson 6th ed. 2003).

By middle adolescence, around age fourteen, most people have developed
the ability to reason approximately as effectively as an adult.23 They are able to
generate and consider multiple alternatives, including the costs and benefits of
each, and their effect on other people, about as well as adults.24 They tend to use
information logically and systematically. This ability is observed even when the
dilemma faced is an hypothetical one. Adolescents use these skills effectively
across a broad variety of situations, including moral dilemmas, interpersonal
relationships, the potential waiver of Miranda rights, and even when dealing with
abstract notions of social justice or public policy.25
In the context of medical decisions, fourteen-year olds score nearly as well
as adults on measures of their careful consideration of the risks and benefits of
undergoing certain medical procedures.26 Fourteen-year olds score significantly
higher than nine-year olds, indicating that the capacity to consider medical
decisions develops rapidly during early adolescence along with the capacity to
carefully consider other types of decisions.27 Interestingly, one hypothetical
situation in which fourteen-year olds performed significantly below the level of
adults involved a treatment that would cure a disorder but would have a
significant negative impact on their physical appearance (attractiveness); this

23 See B. Ambuel and J. Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological and
Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & Human Behavior 129 (1992).
24

See id.

25

See id.

26 L.A. Weithorn and S.A. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Development 1589 (1982).
27

Id.

suggests that differences between middle adolescents and adults arise from
insecurity rather than an actual difference in decisionmaking capability.28

1. Adolescent Decisionmaking Capabilities in the Context of Abortion
Two studies have directly examined the ability of adolescents to make
decisions regarding abortions. One study interviewed women while they were at
their doctors’ offices obtaining pregnancy tests to confirm unwanted
pregnancies.29 The investigators interviewed sixteen women between the ages of
thirteen and seventeen and 26 women between the ages of eighteen and 25. The
investigators measured the number of factors the women took into consideration
when considering whether to have an abortion, whether they had positive feelings
about mothering in general, their estimation of the likely impact of giving birth
on their financial situation, and their estimation of the likely impact on of giving
birth on their current lifestyle and future aspirations. Adolescents were found to
score as well as adults during these interviews.30
A second major study used structured interviews with counselors to
measure the subjects’ ability to consent.31 The counselors interviewed 34
adolescents between fourteen and seventeen years old and 40 adults between
eighteen and 21 years old. The interviews were videotaped and scored by
independently trained evaluators. The evaluation criteria were based on the legal
28

Id.

C.C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors’ and Adults’ Pregnancy Decisions, 50 Am. J. of
Orthopsychiatry 446 (1980).

29

30

Id.

31

See 16 L. & Human Behavior 129, supra note 23.

concept of competence to consent.32 These criteria included consideration of
immediate and future risks and benefits, quality and clarity of reasoning, factors
considered in making a decision, and volition or freedom from coercion. The
adolescents scored as well as the adults on all four measures of competence.33

2. Adolescents’ Voluntary Involvement of their Parents and Their
Competence when They Choose Not to Do So
Most adolescents recognize that their parents have more experience than
they do, and that their parents have their best interests at heart. Consequently,
they tend to involve their parents in abortion decisions even when the law does
not require that they do so.34 About 60% of adolescents voluntarily involve at
least one parent in abortion-related decisions.35 This figure includes about 70% of
fifteen-year olds and nearly 90% of those aged fourteen and under.36 The nearly
ubiquitous and voluntary involvement of an adolescent’s parents at these younger
ages indicates that the adolescent instinctively knows that she is incapable of
making such decisions by herself. The drop-off in voluntary involvement at
approximately age fifteen coincides with the age at which nearly all adolescents

32

See, e.g., 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 65.

33

See 16 L. & Human Behavior 129, supra note 23.

34 S.K. Henshaw and K. Post, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion Decisions, 24 Family
Planning Perspectives 196 (1992); see also L.S. Zabin, M.B. Hirsch, M.R. Emerson, and E.
Raymond, To Whom do Inner-City Minors Talk about their Pregnancies? Adolescents’
Communication with Parents and Parent Surrogates, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 148
(1992).
35

See id.

36

See id.

have been found to be capable of making adult decisions and giving informed
consent regarding abortion-related issues.37 This contention is supported by the
additional fact that whether an adolescent chooses to involve her parents is most
powerfully predicted by her own confidence (measured by self-reporting) in her
ability to make such decisions by herself.38
In states with mandatory parental involvement laws, many adolescents
who do not wish to involve their parents initiate court proceedings to obtain an
abortion without parental consent. To do so in most states, the judge must find
the adolescent competent to make the decision to obtain an abortion by herself
and to give informed consent to the procedure. Alternatively, the judge must find
that, regardless of the adolescent’s competence, it will be in her best interest to
obtain an abortion. In the vast majority of cases for which data are available, the
judge has found the adolescent competent to make an informed decision and
consent to the abortion.39 This trend is surprisingly strong even among judges
who personally oppose abortion.40

B. PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS CAN HAVE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES
The second most powerful predictor of voluntary parental involvement is
whether the adolescent has a positive relationship with her parents and feels that

37

See Section II.A.1 supra.

38

See Henshaw and Post, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 196, supra note 34.

National Academy of Sciences, Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and
Childbearing (1987).

39

40

See id.

her family environment is secure and supportive.41 This statistic is particularly
important because it is adolescents in chaotic, unsupportive, or abusive homes
that are the most likely to initiate intercourse early and to become pregnant
unintentionally.42 An adolescent who grew up in such an environment and is
forced to talk to her parents and an unplanned pregnancy will likely come under
extreme mental distress. Statistically speaking, she probably did not feel
comfortable discussing her sexual activity with her parents in the first place, even
if she had no other way to obtain sex education or contraception, and was
probably hiding it from them.43 She may also have been using sexual activity as a
form of escape or rebellion against her parents.44 Mandatory parental
involvement laws will force an adolescent to return to the very people who in
some sense caused her conundrum (or at least, who she may perceive caused her
conundrum).
Adolescents who become pregnant are much more likely than other
adolescent girls to have been sexually abused and/or raped by a male relative.45
When that relative is a parent or legal guardian, it is unconscionable and, it can
be argued, a form of violence in itself, to require the adolescent to discuss the
abortion with that parent. Even worse, and unfortunately all too common, is

41

See id.

42 D. Boyer and D. Fine, Sexual Abuse as a Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy and Child
Maltreatment, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 4 (1992).

B. Ambuel and C. Lewis, Social Policy of Adolescent Abortion, 15 Child Youth and Family
Services Quarterly 2 (1992).
43

44

See Boyer and Fine, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 4, supra note 42.

45

See id.

when a father, step-father, or mother’s boyfriend is actually the father of the
adolescent’s child. In such cases, the mandatory parental involvement laws in
most states provide for an exception. Usually, this exception is part of the judicial
bypass process. However, the judicial bypass process presents some problems in
itself. It can sometimes be difficult for an adolescent even to learn about her legal
right to seek a judicial waiver of the parental involvement requirement. Because
teenage pregnancy is inversely correlated with wealth and educational
opportunities, the adolescents who are most in need of the judicial bypass
procedure are the least likely to know about it or to have the wherewithal to find
out about it.46 The majority of young women learn when they go to clinics to seek
abortions,47 meaning that they have to find time to come back to the clinic once
they receive their waiver. Once she learns about her rights, she must go to court,
which is usually open only when she ought to be in school. She has to file her
paperwork and appear before the judge who will ask her questions regarding a
topic about which she already feels uncomfortable and scared. Not only is this
process intimidating, but it presents palpable physical risks for the adolescent.
She will be nearly a month pregnant by the time she misses her period, and on
average it takes several weeks to learn about one’s rights and go through the
judicial waiver process.48 Every week that gestation continues brings the young
woman closer to the time when a typical, on-demand first trimester abortion will

46

See Zabin et al., 24 Family Planning Perspectives 148, supra note 34.

47

See Ambuel and Lewis, 15 Child Youth and Family Services Quarterly 2, supra note 43.

48

Id.

not be available.49 Additionally, the longer gestation is allowed to continue, the
higher the risk of abortion-related morbidity and mortality.50 This is of particular
concern for adolescents, whose maternal morbidity and mortality are already
higher than those of adult women.51
The federal Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act also contains an
exception allowing a physician to perform or induce an abortion without
notifying the adolescent’s parents if she has been a victim of parental abuse.52
However, the adolescent must sign a written declaration to that effect.53
Furthermore, the physician must notify the state office charged with protecting
children from abuse in the adolescent’s home state of the alleged abuse.54 The
physician must file the report before he or she may perform the abortion.55 To
make an adolescent sign a legally binding paper is very intimidating and will
make young women hesitant to follow through with the abortion even though it
may be in her best interest. Though ideally, all cases of child abuse, particularly
sexual abuse, should be reported, it is well-known that many, perhaps most, cases
are not reported.56 The reasons are complex, but frequently are due to the

49 The minimum right to abortion that adult American women possess is the right to an ondemand abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50

See Ambuel and Lewis, 15 Child Youth and Family Services Quarterly 2, supra note 43.

51

Id.

52

Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act § 2432(b)(3), supra note 3.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See Boyer and Fine, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 4, supra note 42.

victim’s fear of the abuser and the likelihood of repeated and intensified abuse
after reporting.57 An adolescent who might have her reasons for not coming
forward will be forced either to do so or to carry the child to term. Because a state
agency notified of child abuse by a physician will almost certainly investigate the
matter, the young woman’s parents will still become involved in her abortion
decision against her wishes, albeit after the fact. An adolescent’s shame,
discomfort, and fear of her parents will not decrease after she has had her
abortion. Physically and legally, their involvement might be a moot point after
the fact, but the potential for renewed or increased abuse is still very real. Thus it
is hard to see how the exception in the federal statute is an exception at all. It
adds increased pressure to an already difficult situation for the young woman,
and prohibits physicians from using their best judgment and serving the needs of
their patients. If anything, this provision will actually make it more, not less,
difficult for an adolescent to obtain an abortion without the knowledge of her
parents.
Proponents of mandatory parental involvement laws claim that they are
interested in protecting vulnerable adolescents, who are incapable of making
their own decisions. But it seems that those adolescents are more capable of
making such decisions than is commonly believed, and in many cases those
proponents are hurting the young women they claim to wish to protect.

III. CASES IN SUPPORT OF COEXTENSIVE RIGHTS

57

See id.

I separate cases in support of coextensive rights into two categories. The
first category is cases regarding children’s rights in contexts unrelated to
procreation. If cases, especially in more modern times, have tended to endow
adolescents with rights equal to those to adults, this suggests that procreative
rights should be no different. The second category is cases regarding procreation
itself, both for minors and for adult women. I believe that a synthesis of these
cases will lead to the conclusion that denying adolescents less than coextensive
procreative rights is inconsistent and unsustainable.

A. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: CASES REGARDING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS OUTSIDE

THE

PROCREATIVE CONTEXT HAVE TENDED TO ACCORD MINORS RIGHTS EQUAL OR NEARLY
EQUAL TO THOSE OF ADULTS
Perhaps the most important case affecting the rights of children generally,
and the foundation of much jurisprudence concerning the extent of adolescent
rights, is In re Gault.58 In that case, the Supreme Court decided that adolescent
defendants at criminal trials retain the same basic constitutional protections as
adult defendants. The Court’s concern was that requiring juvenile criminal
proceedings to be identical to those for adults might hamper the rehabilitative
goal that is in theory the major goal of the juvenile justice system. The Court did
not seriously consider the possibility that adolescents might be entitled to fewer
constitutional protections than adults. In fact, the Court famously announced
that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults

58

387 U.S. 1 (1967).

alone.”59 This important holding embodies the basis for many other adolescent
civil rights decisions, including those that announced coextensive rights
regarding freedom to speak and express political opinions,60 freedom to refrain
from speaking,61 and entitlement to the rudiments of due process if they might be
suspended from school.62
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,63 Amish parents who had been convicted of
violating the state’s compulsory school attendance law appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Yoders argued that their fundamental liberty interest in raising their
children as they saw fit should trump the state’s interest in educating children to
function in mainstream society. The Court ruled in favor of the Yoders, accepting
this reasoning.64 Justice Douglas, however, felt that the majority was too
deferential to the parents’ wishes for their children.65 Although he agreed that the
state’s interest in educating its youth should not be immune to individual
exemptions on religious grounds, he “disagree[d] with the Court’s conclusion that
the matter is within the dispensation of the parents alone.”66 He criticized the
majority for framing the issue as a contest between the state’s interest and the
parents’ interest, saying that “[D]espite the Court’s claims, the parents are
59

Id. at 13.

60

Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

61

W. Va. Sch. Bd. of Ed. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

62

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 655 (1975).

63

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

64

See id. at 229–36.

65

See id. at 241–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).

66

See id. at 241.

seeking to vindicate not only their own free exercise claims, but also those of their
high-school-age children.”67 He did not doubt the standing of parents to raise the
religious liberty interests of their children as a defense at trial, but he felt it was
an error to “assume an identity of interest between parent and child.”68 He
further expressed concern that “[i]f the parents in this case are allowed an
exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents’ notion of religious duty
upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express potentially
conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views.”69 This concern led him to the
conclusion that “if an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature
enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the
parents’ religiously motivated objections. Religion is an individual experience. . . .
[It is unacceptable to] analyze[] similar conflicts . . . with little regard for the
views of the child.”70
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,71 a high school student was held to have the same
privacy rights against unreasonable search and seizure as an adult.72
Interestingly, the Court rejected the argument that school officials have authority
to search students based upon less than probable cause because schools act in
67

See id.

68

See id. at 241–42 and 242 n.1.

69

Id. at 242.

Id. at 242–43 (comparing the instant case with Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
which held that a Jehovah’s Witness who had her nine-year old niece and ward distribute
religious literature on the public streets was not in violation of a child labor law).
70

71

469 U.S. 325 (1984).

72

See id.

loco parentis.73 Instead, the Court ruled that a teenager’s Fourth Amendment
rights are the same as those of an adult.74 This is relevant because the Fourth
Amendment is a major source of adult privacy rights against state interference. If
cases that are decided on Fourth Amendment grounds tend to line up in favor of
coextensive rights, it stands to reason that procreative rights ought to be
included.
From these cases we can observe that during the Warren era and on
through the time of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court was moving away from the
conception of minors as entitled to much less constitutional protection than
adults. Instead, it seems that the Court began to move toward a conception of
minors as having as many rights equal to those of adults, to the extent that their
capacity would reasonably allow. Although this formulation has not been the
holding or among the dicta of any case, it serves as a reasonable synthesis of the
Court’s more recent rulings on this matter.
One case that seems to weigh in against coextensive rights for adolescents
is Parham v. J.R.75 In that case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that children
have a fundamental interest in liberty such that parents cannot decide alone to
institutionalize their children.76 Rather, due process requires that some neutral
factfinder or investigator must determine whether the minor is in fact mentally ill
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to the extent that it is appropriate to curtail his liberty.77 Still, the Court held that
the parents nevertheless retained most of the power to make such a decision for
their children because of the fundamental right to raise their children.78 But
Parham can be distinguished from parental involvement laws because, while
Parham involved the forced administration of medical care, parental
involvement laws involve the potential denial of medical care. I believe most
people would not want parents to have the power to deny their children
commonly available life-saving medical treatments. While abortion is rarely a
life-or-death decision, forced parental involvement introduces the possibility that
a young woman will be forced to carry her pregnancy to term, and that her life
will take a radically different course than it otherwise would have. Furthermore,
while Parham discussed the impaired decisionmaking skills of the minors
involved, it was in the context of mental health-related decisions. Minors who are
the subject of institutionalization proceedings are probably at least somewhat
mentally

ill

whether

or

not

they

are

reasonable

candidates

for

institutionalization. Adolescent women who wish to obtain abortions might be
under great stress, but there is no reason to believe a priori that they are
impaired in their decisionmaking skills, particularly in light of the studies
discussed in Section II supra. Finally, there is the issue of fundamental rights.
Both physical freedom and procreation-related decisions have been recognized as
fundamental liberty interests. As mentioned earlier, Parham recognized physical
freedom as a fundamental liberty interest for children. If children are endowed
77
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with some fundamental liberty interests, then there ought to be at least a stated
reason why they are to be denied other fundamental liberty interests. For adults,
it is difficult for the government to surmount a fundamental liberty interest to
impose restrictions. Therefore, it seems to me that there ought to be at least some
level of scrutiny to which restrictions of an adolescent’s fundamental liberty
interests are also subject.
Another case that might seem at first to weigh in against coextensive rights
is Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier.79 In that case, the Court decided that a
high school principal could remove an article from a school newspaper because it
revealed the pregnancy of a fellow student.80 In fact, although the case contains a
great deal of discussion about the role of schools,81 it doesn’t seem that the case is
much different than an invasion of privacy involving adults. In this case it seems
to me that the real issue was not so much the free speech rights of high school
students but a balancing of harms between free speech rights and privacy rights–
a balancing that would occur even if the parties involved were adults.
Furthermore, it is telling that the sensitive issue for the potential victim in this
case was a pregnancy.82 This suggests that a pregnant adolescent has important
privacy interests that ought to be respected not just in the context of school
journalism but by the state as well.
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B. CASES REGARDING PROCREATIVE RIGHTS
In recent years the Supreme Court has made a number of important
rulings regarding procreative rights, both for adults and for adolescents. From
studying cases regarding adolescents, we can derive a clear understanding of the
Court’s policy in this area. But examining the cases regarding adult women’s
procreative rights, it is difficult to conceive why adolescents’ rights should be any
different. It is important to examine the genesis of these rights in the first place,
because of the contention advanced in Section III.A, supra, that the Court has
steadily moved toward a conception of adolescence as a time when constitutional
rights should only be less extensive than those of adults when there is some
compelling state interest at stake, or when the adolescent’s right is outweighed by
the liberty interest of a parent in raising his or her child as he or she sees fit.83 I
will examine whether the logic underpinning these cases referring to adults’
rights can also be applied equally to adolescents. If this is indeed the case, we
must query whether these rights are outweighed by parents’ fundamental liberty
interests in controlling their families and raising their children as they see fit. If
not, the distinction between the procreative rights enjoyed by adults and those
enjoyed by minors is illogical and unsustainable.

1. Cases involving Adolescents’ Procreative Rights
83 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
These two cases are considered the bedrock jurisprudence of family autonomy. They ruled that
the ability to privately order one’s own family is a fundamental liberty interest—one that, since
time immemorial, has been considered the province of one’s own free will and, indeed,
synonymous with adulthood. “The Fourteenth Amendment [encompasses] . . . the right of the
individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. See also
infra p. 23 n.86.

After Roe v. Wade, a number of states that wished to restrict access to
abortion in any way possible passed statutes placing a myriad of conditions and
hurdles in the way of women seeking abortions. This effort continues today, and
nearly every such statute that is passed is met immediately with court challenges
by pro-choice advocacy groups. Even regressive statutes that are clearly
unconstitutional have a good chance of passing in some states, in part because
many legislators wish to test the boundaries of Roe v. Wade, and additionally to
bring the issue in front of the Court again and again in the hopes that Roe will be
overturned. It is not surprising then that much legislation regulating abortions to
be performed on minors have been passed and litigated in the courts. The
Supreme Court has decided several important cases on point.
The first, decided just three years after Roe, is Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth.84 Missouri had passed legislation prohibiting physicians
from performing abortions on unmarried minors without the consent of a parent.
This law contained no judicial bypass procedure. The Court struck down this rule,
saying that because a state may not restrict a woman’s access to abortion during
the first trimester, it also may not grant a third party a veto over a woman’s
abortion during that same period.85 The state of Missouri tried to argue that it
was simply assuring the safety and welfare of minors.86 In response, the Court
noted that Missouri law did not require the consent of a parent in order for a
minor to obtain any other medical or surgical procedure, and that minors were
84
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Id. at 74.
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deemed legally competent even to seek other procreation-related services.87
Although admitting that the state had a compelling interest in safeguarding
minors and that the state’s authority over minors was greater than its authority
over adults, the Court held that a minor’s privacy rights could only be restricted if
the restriction serves “any significant state interest . . . that is not present in the
case of an adult.”88 Finally, the Court rejected the notion that the parental
consent requirement helped maintain family cohesion:

It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a
parent with absolute power to overrule a
determination, made by the physician and his minor
patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will
serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely
that such veto power will enhance parental authority
or control where the minor and the nonconsenting
parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure. Any independent interest the parent
may have in the termination of the minor daughter's
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to
have become pregnant.89
However, the Court did not go so far as to say that adolescents’ rights to obtain
abortions must be coextensive with those of adults: “We emphasize that our
holding . . . does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may
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Id. at 73.

Id. at 75 (emphasis added). This sentence is particularly important because it supports the
contention, stated in Section III.B supra, that the Court is moving toward coextensive rights for
adolescents, modifiable only when the state can show that stakes include either the parent’s
fundamental child-rearing rights or a compelling state interest that differentiates adults from
minors.
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give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.”90 This left open the
possibility that some form of mandatory parental involvement law would pass
constitutional muster, as suggested by Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion,91 which was joined by Justice Powell.
On the same day as the Danforth decision, the Court ruled on a similar
Massachusetts statute in a companion case, Bellotti v. Baird.92 However, because
it was unclear just how absolute the parental consent requirement in that statute
was, the Court certified several questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.93 Upon its return to the Supreme Court, the statute was struck
down by two plurality opinions.94 The major defect was that, although
Massachusetts’ statute contained a judicial bypass procedure, that procedure
effectively inserted the judge into the position of the parents in deciding whether
the abortion was in the young woman’s best interest; the state was delegating to
the judge the same power that it could not permissibly delegate to the
adolescent’s parents under Danforth.95 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion,
however, provided the states with a middle ground. He wrote that it should be
permissible to allow judges to approve an adolescent’s abortion if he or she
decided that the young woman was mature enough to be able to consent to the
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procedure.96 This way, the state would not be delegating anyone an absolute veto
over an adolescent’s decision, but could still protect individual minors from
making decisions they were not competent to make.
It seems that Justice Powell was struggling to balance two competing
interests. First was the interest of the adolescent woman to make a decision for
herself, because bearing a child is one of the most serious things anyone can do.
The other interest was the interest of parents in guiding their child through to
maturity and adulthood. He concluded that neither interest could carry the day:

The abortion decision differs in important ways from
other decisions that may be made during minority. . . .
The pregnant minor’s options are much different
[than those] facing a minor in other situations . . . [a]
pregnant adolescent . . . cannot preserve for long the
possibility of aborting, which effectively expires in a
matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy. . . .
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a
pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority.
Indeed, considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional
maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of
having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility,
for parenthood, like the attainment of the age of
majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the
termination of the legal disabilities of minority. In
sum, there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision will
have consequences so grave and indelible. Yet, an
abortion may not be the best choice for the minor. . . .
[A]lternatives . . . may be feasible and relevant to the
minor’s best interests.97
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Justice Powell felt that the best way to balance the competing interests was
to allow mandatory parental involvement laws but give adolescents a way to
avoid parental involvement if it could be independently assessed that she was
mature enough to do so or had good cause for doing so. In effect, he adopted into
law the Justice Stewart’s suggestion from his Danforth plurality decision.98 While
it is a step in the right direction to give adolescents a way of obtaining an abortion
without involving their parents, it is still unsatisfactory in that it makes doing so
more difficult. Justice Stewart hit the nail on the head when he said that having a
child endows a young woman with adult legal responsibilities. If carrying the
child to term results more or less in the status of adulthood, but an adult-like
competence is expected of an adolescent woman who wishes to abort the fetus,
what is the difference? If the young woman is not allowed to make a decision
requiring adult capacity, the consequence is that she will become an actual adult
in forty short weeks.99 This seems a bit like cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s
face.
The most important case dealing with the right of minors to use
contraception is Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l.100 That case, in relevant part,
dealt with a law not only banning the sale of contraceptives to minors, but to
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In most states, she would not actually become an adult. But she would become a de facto adult
due to the tremendous responsibility that comes with carrying a child to term and raising it after
giving birth (including some responsibilities normally reserved for legal adults). Even with a
supportive family her life has substantially changed and her childhood has effectively ended.
99
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431 U.S. 678 (1977).

adults as well, unless distributed by a physician.101 The law was invalidated on
several grounds. Justice Brennan first noted that

[I]t is clear that among the decisions an individual
may
make
without
unjustified
government
interference are personal decisions “relating to
marriage,
procreation,
contraception,
family
relationships, and child rearing and education.” The
decision whether or not to bear or beget a child is at
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices.102
Carey also continued the line of reasoning from Danforth that a state has to
surmount significant barriers before restricting the privacy interests of
adolescents any more than they can restrict those of adults, ruling that the
restrictions on minors purchasing contraception should be as close as possible to
those placed on adults, because contraception and abortion are two
manifestations of the same basic right to privacy.103 This effectively removed all
restrictions on the sale of “non-hazardous” contraceptives to minors, because
earlier in the opinion Carey outlawed the restriction of contraceptive distribution
to licensed pharmacists.104 The Court did not accept New York’s argument that
101
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Id. at 684–85 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53, supra note 49).

Id. at 693–97. In particular, ‘[T]he right to privacy in decisions regarding procreation extends
to minors as well as adults.” Id. at 693 (emphasis added). Furthermore, “’the state does not have
the authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto’ . . . [rather, s]tate
restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve ‘any significant state
interest . . . that is not present in the case of an adult.’” Id. at 693, quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at
74–75 (emphasis added). Because Planned Parenthood found no significant state interest was
served by parental consent requirements, and identical reasoning was used to strike down
consent and notification requirements for adult women, this seems to suggest that no significant
state interest is served by parental notification requirements for adolescents.
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the law was justifiable to protect the morality of minors or to make it more
difficult for minors to engage in sexual intercourse. Justice White wrote
separately to express his doubt that the law would have a significant effect on
either.105 Justice Stevens wrote separately to express his view that even if the law
could positively further these goals, it was far too broad to accomplish these
narrow objectives.106 Justice Stevens also wrote that it seems hypocritical of the
state to profess concern for the welfare of minors but deny them the easiest
method of preventing unwanted pregnancies and venereal diseases:

It is almost unprecedented . . . for a state to require
that an ill-advised act by a minor give rise to a greater
risk of irreparable harm than a similar act by an adult.
Common sense indicates that many young people will
engage in sexual activity regardless of what the New
York legislature does; and further, that the incidence
of venereal disease and premarital pregnancy is
affected by the availability or unavailability of
contraceptives. Although young persons theoretically
may avoid those harms by practicing total abstention,
inevitably many will not. The statutory provision
denies them a choice which, if available, would reduce
their exposure to disease or unwanted pregnancy.107
He compared the law to a hypothetical regulation that expressed disapproval of
motorcycles by outlawing the sale of helmets: “One need not posit a
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constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize such a restriction as
irrational and perverse.”108
The state had in fact conceded that the law probably would not
significantly reduce the number of teenagers who chose to engage in sexual
activity, or even enter their minds when making such decisions.109 This makes
sense because there is little incentive to educate adolescents about contraceptives
if they cannot obtain them; it’s difficult to miss or wish for something to which
you have no access and with which you have no experience. “Rather, [the state of
New York’s] central argument is that the statute has the important symbolic
effect of communicating disapproval of sexual activity by minors. In essence,
therefore, the statute is defended as a form of propaganda, rather than a
regulation of behavior.”110 It seems unlikely that a state could restrict the rights of
adults for endorsement or propaganda purposes, and public health concerns
weigh strongly against doing so to adolescents.
It is hard to imagine a restriction on adolescents’ procreative rights that
would be narrowly tailored enough to advance these goals and not unnecessarily
infringe on their privacy rights. A better idea would be for the state through its
schools to educate adolescents to carefully consider sexual activity.

See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). This sentence is the main point of contention between
the concurring Justices, who did not join in Part IV of the majority opinion, and Justice Powell.
Justices White and Stevens, in particular, did not want to leave open the question of whether a
state can regulate the sexual activity of unmarried minors (such as with age of consent laws), and
felt that the issue need not be reached to invalidate the statues at question in the instant case. See
id. at 702–03 (White, J., concurring), 713 (Stevens, J. concurring).
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2. Cases Regarding Adult Women’s Procreative Rights Also Argue for
Adolescents’ Procreative Rights
Danforth also ruled on a portion of the Missouri statute that required
spousal consent before an abortion may be performed.111 The Court struck down
the statute on many of the same grounds upon which it struck down the parental
consent provision as written.112 The state of Missouri claimed that its legislature
had enacted the provision because of its “perception of marriage as an
institution,” and its perceived duty to protect that institution by ensuring that
such important decisions be made jointly by both partners.113 The state also
argued that it imposes a number of other statutory limitations on important
decisions frequently made by married couples, including those related to
procreation,114 and that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was not
substantially different than those other decisions, the state’s regulation of which
has not been seriously challenged.
The Court reasoned, however, that requiring the consent of both spouses
to an abortion gives the husband an effective veto over the decision and de facto
control over his wife’s body.115 The Court was not oblivious to the argument that a
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Examples include the requirement that both spouses consent to the adoption of a child born in
wedlock, that both spouses consent to the artificial insemination of the woman, and the
criminalization of polygamy and adultery. See id. at 68. The state argued that, because the events
that led to the pregnancy were set in motion by mutual consent, that the pregnancy ought to be
terminated only by mutual consent. See id.
114
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See id. at 68–69, 71.

husband ought to be involved in such an important decision, but felt that
ultimately the choice had to belong to the woman:

We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern
and interest that a devoted and protective husband
has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying. Neither has
this Court failed to appreciate the importance of the
marital relationship in our society. . . . Moreover, we
recognize that the decision whether to undergo or to
forgo an abortion may have profound effects on the
future of any marriage, effects that are both physical
and mental, and possibly deleterious. . . . It seems
manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a
pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the
wife and her husband. No marriage may be viewed as
harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are
fundamentally divided on so important and vital an
issue. But it is difficult to believe that the goal of
fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of
strengthening the marital relationship and the
marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the
husband a veto power exercisable for any reason
whatsoever or for no reason at all. . . . [I]t is not at all
likely that such action would further, as the District
Court majority phrased it, the “interest of the state in
protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to the
marriage relationship.” We recognize, of course, that
when a woman, with the approval of her physician but
without the approval of her husband, decides to
terminate her pregnancy, it could be said that she is
acting unilaterally. The obvious fact is that when the
wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the
view of only one of the two marriage partners can
prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between
the two, the balance weighs in her favor.116
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Interestingly, this type of analysis, that the party who will bear the greatest
burden should make the final decision, is absent from the section of the decision
that strikes down the parental consent law as written.117 This omission is striking
if the weight of the burden carried is considered realistically. In theory, according
to the idealized “concept of marriage as an institution” envisioned by the
Missouri legislature, a married woman will have the financial and emotional
support of her husband, a completed education, the capacity for employment if
necessary, and security. An adolescent who bring a child to term will have none of
these advantages, or will have them to a much lesser degree than her married
counterpart. Yet the Court made it easier for the married woman to terminate her
pregnancy free of third-party interference than for the adolescent woman. This is
entirely illogical. This difference in burdens was even recognized in Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bellotti II,118 but the Court never made the direct comparison
between the two that might have brought them to the realization that parental
consent laws are even worse than spousal consent laws.
Furthermore, it is curious that the state’s interest in maintaining and
protecting the husband-wife relationship is rejected as a justification for a
spousal consent requirement, while the state’s interest in maintaining and
protecting the parent-child relationship is accepted as a justification for at least
some (rebuttable) parental consent requirement. It is difficult to say that one type
of relationship has deeper or longer-lasting emotional bonds than the other. But
it is clear that, in theory, the husband-wife relationship lasts from marriage until
117
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death, whereas many aspects of the parent-child relationship end when the child
reaches the age of majority. Most American children leave their parents’ homes
shortly after reaching the age of majority. At this age, parents also cease to be
legally responsible for the care and maintenance of their children.119 The child’s
property interests are no longer bound with the parents’, and the parties have
little or no legal responsibility left toward one another. Of course, we would hope
that in a loving family nothing significant would change in an emotional sense
simply because a child reaches the age of majority. But compare the transition to
adulthood with a marital relationship which, unlike the parent-child relationship,
is entered into of one’s own free will. Spouses have joint financial and property
interests. They usually live under the same roof throughout the marriage. They
have legal obligations to one another. Marriages are convenient units for the
ordering of public and private pension plans, demographic data, and insurance
policies. And unlike minority status, a marriage is theoretically indefinite. An
adolescent who has an unwanted pregnancy will probably live with her parents
for only a few short years more.120 These are examples of why, if a state is
concerned about the fundamental importance of certain relationships, the
institution of marriage might even justifiably be encumbered with more
restrictions than the parent-child relationship, not fewer. The purpose of this
article is not to advocate this. It simply observes that it is intellectually
It should be noted that in some states, child support payments have been extended until the
child is 21 or 22, particularly if they attend college. (Citations omitted.) Nevertheless, the legal
obligation of a parent for his child will end at some defined point in time.
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inconsistent to cite the protection of a special relationship as justification for a
third-party involvement requirement for abortion when there are relationships
that might be considered even closer and more legally constricting which cannot
be used as a justification for such third-party involvement requirements.
Roe implemented a framework for when a woman had a constitutional
right to abortion on demand that was based on the trimester status of her
pregnancy.121 These guidelines were modified, with additional justification for the
constitutional right to abortion, by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey.122
The Court left intact the absolute right of a woman to obtain an abortion before
fetal viability.123 Roe had found the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy
based in an individual’s privacy rights.124 The Court in Casey built upon this
conclusion to invalidate state laws that place an “undue burden” on a woman’s
right to seek an abortion.125 The Court decided that an undue burden exists if the
purpose or effect of the law in question is to place substantial obstacles in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion.126 The Court reflected that psychological
harm could be included in the concept of the undue burden.127 Because this is the
case, the Court decided that there were limits on the information the state could
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require physicians to provide to a woman seeking an abortion, and limits on what
the state could require a woman to do to obtain an abortion, beyond signing
informed consent documents.128 But if a woman who seeks an abortion is entitled
to be free from psychological harm at the hands of the state, how can the state
require an adolescent to inform her parents or to require the consent of parents
in order to obtain an abortion? There are probably few things that could cause an
already emotional pregnant adolescent more psychological harm that revealing
her sexual activity and her pregnancy to her parents, if for some reason she
wishes not to involve them.
Another interesting facet of Casey is that it revisited the issue of spousal
involvement.129 Danforth had already outlawed spousal consent requirements.
Casey now dealt with a requirement that a married woman seeking an abortion
must provide her physician with a signed statement that she has informed her
husband of her intentions,130 and a requirement that a minor inform her parents
of her intentions.131 The Court struck the spousal information requirement down
for two reasons.
The first reason for striking down the requirement was the high stress
under which women often find themselves when attempting to seek abortions.132
Frequently, communicating with their husbands results in increased stress and
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increased conflict. Furthermore, women in strong, supportive, and healthy
marriages almost invariably consult their husbands before deciding whether to
terminate the pregnancy.133 If a woman chooses not to consult her husband, there
is usually a good reason. The opinion cites numerous scientific studies attesting
to these facts.134 Those studies cited also warn that a spousal notification
requirement poses a particularly grave danger to women who are victims of
spousal abuse:

The 'bodily injury' exception could not be invoked by a
married woman whose husband, if notified, would, in
her reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her
intent to have an abortion to family, friends or
acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child
custody or divorce proceedings; (c) inflict
psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon
her, her children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily
harm on other persons such as children, family
members or other loved ones; or (e) use his control
over finances to deprive her of necessary monies for
herself or her children. . . . Women of all class levels,
educational backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and
religious groups are battered. . . . Wife-battering or
abuse can take on many physical and psychological
forms. The nature and scope of the battering can
cover a broad range of actions and be gruesome and
torturous. . . . Married women, victims of battering,
have been killed in Pennsylvania and throughout the
United States. . . . Battering can often involve a
substantial amount of sexual abuse, including marital
rape and sexual mutilation. . . . Mere notification of
pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and
violence within the family. The number of battering
incidents is high during the pregnancy and often the
worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy. . . .
Even when confronted directly by medical personnel
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or other helping professionals, battered women often
will not admit to the battering because they have not
admitted to themselves that they are battered. . . .
Because of the nature of the battering relationship,
battered women are unlikely to avail themselves of the
exceptions . . . of the Act, regardless of whether the
section applies to them.135
All are excellent reasons why married women should not be forced to notify their
husbands that they plan to seek an abortion, and the Court ruled properly.
However, in the above quotation, if the word “woman” were replaced with “girl,”
“wife” replaced with “daughter,” and “husband” with “father” or “parents,” all of
the statements therein would remain true. Again, like the comparison between
Danforth and Bellotti II, the Court had all the facts it needed at hand and failed,
or refused, to understand that when it comes to unwanted pregnancies, a
teenager’s situation is nearly identical to an adult woman’s. What makes this
instance even more frustrating is that both requirements were considered in the
same case.
Amazingly, the Court went on to discuss the spousal information
requirement as an anachronism from the era when a married woman ceased to
have her own legal existence and was considered a dependent of her husband or
even as her husband’s property.136 The Court concluded that the spousal
information requirement is inconsistent with the evolution of our jurisprudence,
which has abandoned common-law conceptions of the status of women in
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society.137 But in this regard, women and children were treated approximately
equally by the common law. If the common-law disability and coverture rules as
applied to adult women are an anachronism, then it is reasonable to conclude
that at least some (perhaps most) of those rules as applied to minor children are
equally anachronistic. It is logically inconsistent and cruelly ignorant to recognize
the serious dangers posed to women forced to inform their husbands of their
intention to terminate a pregnancy and to ignore the equally serious dangers
posed to teenagers forced to inform their parents of the same thing. The Court’s
refusal to examine the parental information requirement more critically is
inconsistent with the momentum of the Court’s view of children toward a concept
of children’s rights as lesser than those of adults only to the extent that they must
be to protect them and account for their lesser capacities.138
Because of this evolution of the Court’s view of children, and the
substantial harm that results from such laws, it is time for the Court to rectify its
inconsistencies and recognize the justifications that apply to adult women’s
freedom from third-party constraints also apply to adolescent women.

IV. A NOTE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF MY ARGUMENT
If adolescent women are to have the same rights as adult women to
procreative decisions, particularly abortion, they must also bear adult
responsibility for the consequences of their actions. In a few states, bearing a
child and living in a conjugal relationship with the father results in the automatic
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emancipation of the minor.139 I believe that a minor female who bears a child
should become an adult upon childbirth, in order for the law to remain logically
consistent with my suggestion about endowing teenage women with coextensive
procreative rights. I hope that her family will be loving and supportive and that
this emancipation will not significantly affect family relations. However, a woman
who bears a child needs to have the full-fledged rights of an adult in order to care
for the family she has established, and states’ family laws ought to evolve to
reflect this.

V. CONCLUSION
A great deal of psychological research has shown that adolescent women
are, generally speaking, able to consider and make procreative decisions with
effectiveness comparable to that of adult women. This is particularly true at the
ages when most adolescent pregnancies occur. In fact, it can be taken as a
hallmark of maturity that most young women involve their parents in such
decisions. Furthermore, the same body of research has shown that when
adolescent women choose not to involve their parents, they do so for valid and
powerful reasons.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding adolescents has come a long
way in the past five decades. It has laudably recognized that minors, especially
adolescents, have some capacities similar to adults, and furthermore that some
individuality and freedom is necessary to socialization and maturing into a
functioning adult member of society. The Court has properly recognized that
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reaching the age of majority is not an on-off switch for most rights. Furthermore,
the Court has recognized that in the particularly sensitive area of procreative
rights, adolescents ought to be free to make their own decisions at least to some
extent, because of the gravity of the decisions and the consequences of involving
third parties, particularly their parents.
Now it is time for the Court to clean up its jurisprudence in this critical
area. The interests at stake for the adolescent are too high, and the results of bad
laws too destructive, to allow the current incoherent policies to continue. This is
particularly important in the face of new restrictions being considered by the U.S.
Congress. I hope the Court will fulfill what I believe to be its obligation to grant
adolescents coextensive abortion rights.

